This article aims to give an overview of the system of European Union (EU) crisis management. Ongoing and completed missions and operations will be presented to show the wide-spread possibilities of the EU's crisis management system. The article will focus especially on the practical output of crisis management missions and operations and special attention will be given to the question whether and to what extent the EU is able to "transfer democracy" to third states.
This article aims to give an overview of the system of European Union (EU) crisis management. Ongoing and completed missions and operations will be presented to show the wide-spread possibilities of the EU's crisis management system. The article will focus especially on the practical output of crisis management missions and operations and special attention will be given to the question whether and to what extent the EU is able to "transfer democracy" to third states. 1 The author is currently revising her doctoral thesis concerning "The European Security and Defense Policy in a Multi-level System, as exemplified by the Military Operation of the EU in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003", under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Michael Bothe.
I. Overview of EU Crisis Management Operations and Missions
To give an appropriate overview of EU crisis management it is necessary to start with a differentiation of the types of actions taken in the field of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The following section deals with completed and ongoing operations and missions.
Differentiation
When considering EU crisis management one has to differentiate between two types of action: crisis management operations and crisis management missions. Crisis management operations usually have a military component, while crisis management missions are usually of a civilian nature. Thus these two types of ESDP actions are often combined, especially in the field of civilian-military crisis management in which the EU specializes. Since these regimes are shaped differently, the combination is legally difficult to manage. Furthermore, the socioeconomic dimension of complex crisis management undertakings requires a multifaceted scope which is not limited to military options. The year 2007 e.g. saw the increasing trend of deploying peace operations with broad civilian mandates. The result has been a growing complexity of peace operations that is proving difficult to manage. 2 Unfortunately there exists no consistent and uniform nomenclature in the EU documents naming the different actions the EU might undertake.
Operations and Missions in Particular
In the period between 2003 and 2009, the EU has launched twentythree crisis management missions and operations in twelve third-world countries within the context of ESDP (see Annex). These have ranged from advisory missions consisting of fewer than a dozen experts to large-scale peacekeeping operations involving several thousands of military personnel. Out of the twenty-three, six were military operations carrying out general peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks. The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, author- ized five of these operations to take enforcement action in the performance of their mandate. The sixth operation ("Concordia") followed an explicit request from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia government.
In addition, the EU has launched seventeen civilian crisis management missions, including seven police, three rule of law, two monitoring, two security sector, and two border assistance missions, and has undertaken one mixed civilian-military mission. 3 These numbers show the high potential in this policy field.
There are fourteen ongoing operations and missions: three military operations, four police missions, two rule of law missions, two border assistance missions, two security sector reform missions and finally one monitoring mission in Georgia.
In detail: there is one military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina named EUFOR Althea 4 which is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, under the "Berlin Plus" Agreement. 5 Another military operation takes place in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA). 6 This is a bridging operation which will closely coordinate with the multi-dimensional United Nations (MIN-URCAT) presence in the East of Chad and in the North-East of the Central African Republic in order to improve security in those regions. take the Third Party role proposed in the Agreement to monitor the operations of this border Crossing Point. Due to the circumstances of the Rafah Crossing Point -there is temporarily no access for mission personnel to the Crossing Point -it is a problematic mission.
The other border assistance mission which is technical and advisory in nature is being carried out in Moldova and Ukraine (EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, code-named EUBAM). 16 Its mandate is to help improve the capacity of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border and custom services to prevent and detect smuggling, trafficking of goods and human beings, as well as custom fraud, by providing advice and training. This mission is carried out under first pillar (see below) conditions and competences.
There is further one security sector reform mission in Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) 17 which followed an official request by the government of the DRC. The mission provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are in line with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law. Additionally, the EU has launched a mission in support of the security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) 18 which will be undertaken in partnership with the Guinea-Bissau authorities. It will provide advice and assistance regarding the reform of the security sector in order to contribute to the creation of conditions for the implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy. The mission is part of a coherent EU approach and complementary to the European Development Fund and other European Community activities. 16 19 Its objective is to contribute to stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding regions. In the short term, its aim is to contribute to the stabilization of the situation, in accordance with the six-point cease-fire agreement and the subsequent implementing measures.
This enumeration shows that civilian crisis management in all its facets is the area in which the EU has made the fastest operational progress. 20
II. General Legal Framework

Mixture of Civilian and Military Crisis Management and its Problems
Civilian crisis management is peculiar to the EU and has no real equivalent in the lexicons of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or non-European regional organizations. 21 The interrelationship between the military and civilian components is usually characterized as one between distinct entities with the military providing support and backup to the civilian presence in the field. This support is grounded in the military's ability to wield overwhelming force. 22 Nevertheless, civilian crisis management is an instrument for international actors to help create the structures and capacities that enable the state to provide for the security and safety of its 19 Civilian and military crisis management of the EU are shaped in a different way. This is largely due to the different participation of the European Commission and the European Parliament in the field of military crisis management on the one hand and civilian crisis management on the other. 24 
To alleviate tensions one could develop a catalogue of criteria. Such a catalogue could be generated on the basis of completed military and civilian missions. Then, a fixed number of civilian as well as military criteria must be fulfilled to make combined crisis management possible. Another possibility would be to rely on the focus of a specific action. 25 Still the question remains exactly how the European Commission and the European Parliament take part in this combined crisis management.
A greater framework than the presently existing Political and Security Committee (PSC) is needed. 26 Therefore the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM), could be further developed as a coordinating mechanism. Thus, it is possible to achieve a step-by-step cooperation (or participation) in the field of civilian-military crisis management. It would be further possible and at the same time less cost-intensive to establish, for example, a common "Security Council" in which the PSC takes the leading role and the other two EU pillars (see below) are represented. The only rational alternative solution to such an intensified coordination between the pillars of the EU would be to abandon the pillar structure 27 -but the loss of the pillars might be possible, if at all, only in the long run.
Another open question is the implementation of financing. The lack of transparency emerges particularly in the so-called hybrid operations that is to say in the field of civilian-military foreign assignment of the EU. These operations are financed through the budget of the EU. 28 According to the financing options for civilian ESDP-missions (from the budget of the European Community), voluntary national dues (as for military ESDP-operations) or as was the case with ATHENA, the creation of a special financing mechanism, 29 could be considered.
There are no participation rights foreseen for the European Parliament during the raising of national funds for the accomplishment of a common action. 30 ATHENA is rather a model for a financing mechanism for military ESDP-operations. Thus, the budgetary powers of the European Parliament in the field of civilian-military crisis management would be restricted. This is due to the fact that shadow-budgets in the exclusive intergovernmental scope of the European Council are increasingly being established. 31 The only alternative would be the financing through the European Community's budget. This would further promote the collectivization of ESDP and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Command and control authorities remain, however, the most problematic issue in EU civil-military coordination. The military chain of command in EU operations is, currently, distinct and separate from the 27 
Legal Basis in European and International Law
The potential legal basis for EU operations and missions in European law is article 14 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in conjunction with article 17 para. 2 TEU. In particular the operative advancement of the EU may be based on the instrument "Common Action" according to article 14 TEU (in conjunction with article 17 para. 2 TEU). The socalled Petersberg-tasks in article 17 para. 2 TEU include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 34 EU operations and missions are derived from article 14 TEU in the form of a Common Action which is (usually) legally binding for all EU Member States -except Denmark which secured itself an opt-out. This type of action is typical for the operative progression of the EU. In such a Common Action, a goal, the means, the amount/the complexity, the terms and conditions, and (if necessary) the period of the action must all be specified. But these are (only) formal requirements. The requirement of unanimity for decision-making underlines the intergovernmental character of the ESDP and the central role of the Council of the EU. Thus, only the Member States which abstain from voting without blocking the whole operation or mission are not obliged to contribute to the financing of the specific action.
Both civil and military ESDP missions and operations are typically executed in a two-step procedure. In the first step, the Council decides upon a common action, which regulates the basic parameters for a common approach to a concrete conflict. In a second step, the Council The EU is not a state and thus not bound formally by the Charter of the United Nations and due to emerging opinions of legal scholars, 35 the legal basis of the EU in international law is not particularly clear. No restriction can be found in article 17 para. 2 TEU. This means that the EU is able to carry out operations and missions which are neither limited by geographic criteria nor by a certain intensity of threat. 36 Secondly, one of the objectives of the EU as defined in article 11 para. 2 TEU is to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations when defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy. Additionally, there are several declarations concerning the collaboration between the United Nations and the EU. 37 Therein it is especially recalled that the United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations entail the prohibition of the use of force and basically the need for a Security Council Resolution in case of any military coercive means. On the other hand, the EU can also rely on the exemptions from the prohibition of the use of force. This is foremost the right to self-defense and peace-keeping operations which do not constitute coercive means due to the given consent of the state concerned. Furthermore the EU may rely on possible exemptions from the prohibition of the use of force which could develop on the basis of customary international law. Arti- 35 Some scholars want to establish more exceptions from the United Nations Security Council's power to allow the use of force; an overview is given by Kaufmann-Bühler, see note 30, "Art. 17 EUV", para. 8. 36 cle 11 para. 2 TEU refers to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in a dynamic way. 38
III. Transfer of Democracy?
Another question which remains is whether and to what extent the crisis management system of the EU really contributes to a transfer of democracy into third countries. Therefore it is necessary to analyze the EU's rule of law 39 concept and to have a closer look at the practical output of its crisis management missions.
Rule of Law Concept of the EU
The EU's rule of law concept must be seen in the context of the three pillar structure of the Union. The EU is built under a single institutional roof standing on three pillars, established by the Treaty on the EU (1992). The first pillar is the Community pillar, including the three European Communities (EC, Euratom, ECSC). The second pillar is cooperation between the Member States in the common foreign and security policy (the third pillar is cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA)). The Commission holds several instruments for non-coercive intervention under the first pillar. 40 It aims at strengthening and enforcing economic development, but also the respect for human rights, democratic values and the rule of law. For this purpose, the EU has launched various cooperation programs designed to assist political and economic transformation in all parts of the world, but in particular with regard to the Mediterranean area, to Central and Eastern Europe as well as to the Balkans (e.g. Phare, Tacis, Meda or Cards programs). In contrast, the Council of the European Union and the Member States rule in the second pillar within the framework of CFDP and ESDP. 42 Therein the EU tries to deal with potential crises, ongoing conflicts and/or post-conflict situations. 43 Here the second pillar will be focused on where the EU made the rule of law a priority, 44 and elaborated a concept for missions in this field. 45 At the Göteborg European Council in June 2001 two generic concepts of rule of law missions were elaborated:
− "Strengthening the rule of law" missions:
In this case personnel in the field of the rule of law are deployed essentially to educate, train, monitor and advise with the aim of bringing the local legal system up to international standards, in particular in the field of human rights. This includes technical assistance, advice on institutions related to capacity building (training, education, and standard setting), monitoring and mentoring of personnel, and the application of legislation and administrative procedures; 46 and − "Substitution for local judiciary/ legal system" operations:
These missions involve the deployment of personnel to carry out executive functions, notably where local structures are failing. The objective here is to consolidate the rule of law in a crisis situation in order to restore public order and security. These missions thus concern the functions of the courts, the prosecution system and the running of prisons as well as the provision of defense lawyers. 47 The general objective of both types of missions is "to provide for complete and sustainable judiciary and penitentiary systems under local ownership and meeting rule of law and human rights standards in the mission area." 48 According to the European Parliament "security and the rule of law are indispensable preconditions for development and long-term stability." 49 This shows the inter-linkage between first and second pillar activities. Nevertheless the problem of coordination between the first and second pillar needs to be solved. 50 Therefore a closer look at the practical output of EU crisis management missions and operations is necessary.
Result of the EU Crisis Management Missions and Operations: Practical Output
In general, EU crisis management missions and operations seem to be successful. But, this rhetoric does not exactly correspond to reality. The EU is facing numerous problems in regard to crisis management. In part, this is due to the fact that the ESDP is still in its early stages. It evolved at the beginning of the 2000's and is still in its infancy. Therefore, the EU still lacks capacities to carry out autonomous operations on a greater scale. In this field, larger operations are not possible without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Consequently, non-EU Member States like the United States, Canada and Turkey have a stake in genuine European decision-making and panels.
A good example is the deployment of EUPOL Afghanistan which was delayed by Turkey, which used its NATO veto to show its displeasure with the EU. The EU mission has no cooperation agreement with NATO which operates in Afghanistan under the mandates of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) and operation Enduring Freedom. This means that EU police officers cannot automatically be given NATO intelligence or backup support should they come under attack from the Taliban. 51 Furthermore, the political impact of some 48 53 and finally the coordination within and between each other could be much improved. Another example is the EU's engagement in Africa, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which is mainly promoted by France and the former colonial power, Belgium. The country has been a major focus for Europe and a proving ground for an evolving European policy. Through operation "Artemis" the EU has demonstrated for the first time a common European capability to launch military force over a great distance without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. 54 Nevertheless the role of the EU in Africa is often criticized for being rather idealistic. 55 The problem may be located in the implementation of the abstract goals such as promoting democracy, strengthening the rule of law and others.
Finally the change of a despotic state into a state which respects the rule of law needs decades but EU missions have a limited time frame. When money is available, they are prolonged from one year to another. Nevertheless it is unlikely that they can run for decades. Hence, the EU has to develop substantial strategies. The lack of a strong sense of common purposes in the foreign and security policy strongly indicates that less ambitious but feasible crisis management policies, as opposed to morally stringent but difficult policies, are more conducive to the development of EU cohesion and common strategies. 56 A general problem of the so-called rule of law missions is the understanding of the whole concept behind the idea, i.e. the question whether rule of law is meant in a formal or in a material way. Whereas a formal rule of law concept means "solely" a commitment to the law in force, a material rule of law concept involves the notion of justice. International consensus may be obtained on the formal rule of law concept. Nevertheless, this concept has to be adapted to the cultural background of a specific country. That means that a specific European rule of law concept cannot be exported from one country to another. The rule of law of a state is not a worldwide patent remedy. According to a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, rule of law, "refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions or entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and in-dependently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards." 57 This rule of law concept is both formal and material. 58 Nevertheless international consensus may be reached on it, because it refers on the material side to international human rights norms and standards on which consensus may be obtained. But one must bear in mind that there are still regimes refusing to respect fundamental human rights. Crisis management in general is a very complex issue. The overall problem is one of connecting the use of force to the issue of local growth of democracy. 59 In principle the EU has quite a good starting position because of its combined military and civil crisis management capabilities. 60 For the United Nations the EU is an attractive partner, it is widely accepted in the world, sometimes even more than NATO, which often is seen as dominated by the United States of America. 61 A possibility to develop substantial strategies could be the broadening of the scope of the defense policy of the EU and loosening the connection to overall worthy political goals, such as democracy and prosperity. 62 But this would make the demarcation of powers between the two pillars even more complicated. Therefore, coordination and cooperation between the different pillars and institutions remains a crucial challenge for the future effectiveness of the EU's crisis management system. 63 
